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SPECIAL PROJECT

Current Issues in Arbitration

Introduction
"[An incompetent attorney can delay a case for years, while a
competent attorney can delay it for even longer."'
This oft-repeated joke illustrates the public perception of the
delays and expense that accompany courtroom litigation. Indeed,
growing frustration with crowded courts and exorbitant legal costs
fuels the widespread Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") movement.2 Notwithstanding the dramatic increase in its use, ADR, defined as "procedures for settling disputes by means other than litigation,"3 is not a novel idea. In fact, ADR was present in America as
early as the seventeenth century.4 In certain parts of colonial
America, voluntary arbitration was a common way to settle disputes;
judicial enforcement was largely unnecessary because of the trust
inherent in a society in which survival depended on cooperation.5 By
the early 1700s, however, rapid population growth and increased

1.

Lisa S. Howard, ADR Can Cut Hours, Costs, Lawyers Say, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Apr.

7, 1997, at 9.
2.
See Eric Schine & Linda Himelstein, The Explosion in Private Justice: Demand for
Civil ArbitrationFuelsthe Rise of an Industry,Bus. WV., June 12, 1995, at 88.
3.
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 78 (6th ed. 1990). Some scholars, however, argue that ADR
is an alternative not to adjudication, but to unassisted settlement negotiations between
attorneys. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a Mediatorfor?": Mediation's 'ValueAdded"for Negotiators,12 OFHO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 5-6 (1996).
4.
See Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the
American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443,445 (1984).
5.
See id. at 448-56 (describing the use of arbitration in seventeenth-century
Connecticut).

682

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:681

migration triggered a drastic change in the nature of dispute resoluvoluntary arbitration, people
tion.6 No longer able to rely on purely
7
court.
in
disputes
increasingly resolved
Years later, the Civil Rights struggles and Vietnam War protests of the 1960s and 1970s discouraged tolerance for traditional
courtroom disputes, while, ironically, generating new statutory causes
of action. 8 The confluence of these trends triggered the modern ADR
movement. 9 Since then, the use of ADR has increased dramatically. 1°
Today, ADR is used in virtually all fields, including labor and employment disputes, small civil disputes, family disputes, consumer
problems, environmental complaints, prisoner grievances and international conflicts."
Despite the dramatic increase in the use of ADR, critics are
quick to point out ADR's shortcomings. Many critics argue that ADR
is a lesser form of justice, claiming that it is almost always biased in
favor of large corporations, especially those who regularly employ
ADR methods. 12 Other scholars maintain that as ADR becomes more
prevalent in modern society, it becomes more mainstream than
alternative. 13 As ADR becomes more institutionalized, the flexibility
traditionally associated with ADR, as well as the parties' ability to
dictate their own terms, naturally decreases. 4 In addition, the close

See id. at 456-60.
6.
7.
See id.
See Frank E.A. Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37
8.
FLA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985).
See id.
9.

10.

For example, case filings with the American Arbitration Association ("AAA!) increased

31% between 1985 and 1994. See Howard J. Aibel & George H. Friedman, Drafting Dispute
Resolution Clauses in Complex Business Transactions,in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, DRAFTING
CORPORATE AGREEMENTS 771, 771 n.4 (1997); see also Sally Engle Merry, Disputing Without
Culture, 100 HARv. L. REv. 2057, 2058 (1987) (reviewing STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (1985)) (discussing the rapid growth of alternative dispute resolution procedures
since the mid-1970s).
11. See Merry, supra note 10, at 2058.

12. A recent AAA study indicates that in employment arbitration proceedings, the odds
favoring the company are five to one when the company has ADR experience. When companies
appear for the first time, however, the odds are two to one that the worker will prevail. See
Edward Baig, When It's Time to Do Battle With Your Company, BUS. WK., Feb. 10, 1997, at 130,
131.
13. See Merry, supra note 10, at 2059 (explaining that as ADR expands, it becomes entan-

gled with the courts and the legal profession).
14.

See id. at 2068 (stating that as ADR becomes more intertwined with the legal system,

"routine treatment, delay, and impersonality are likely to reemerge").
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link with the legal profession and its accompanying regulations may
also hamper the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of ADR. 15
These criticisms may apply equally to all forms of ADR; however, unique concerns accompany specific methods of dispute
resolution. The different forms of ADR include arbitration, mediation, and mini-trials.16 Arbitration is adjudicatory in nature and most
closely resembles litigation.Y7 In arbitration proceedings, parties,
pursuant to an arbitration agreement, submit their dispute for
consideration by an arbitrator whom the parties have selected.18 After
hearing both sides of the dispute, the arbitrator renders a binding
decision.19 Unlike litigation, however, the decision in an arbitration is
final and usually cannot be appealed, regardless of whether it was
fair or consistent with well-settled legal principles.20 This finality
highlights the importance of a fair and equitable arbitration agreement, one that demonstrates precisely the intent of each party. This
year's Special Project focuses on the particular legal issues surrounding the creation and interpretation of arbitration agreements. The
following Notes seek to guide courts and policymakers struggling to
decide these critical issues.
One issue with which courts and scholars have struggled is the
enforcement of compulsory arbitration agreements in employment
contracts. 2' Employers are increasingly including mandatory, binding
arbitration clauses in pre-employment agreements to force employees
into arbitrating statutory discrimination claims; however, the
enforceability of such clauses is unclear, particularly when contained
in collective bargaining agreements. 22 The first Note in this Special
Project, Compulsory ArbitrationAgreements in Employment Contracts
from Gardner-Denver to Austin: The Legal Uncertainty and Why
Employers Should Choose Not to Use Pre-Employment Arbitration
Agreements, emphasizes the lack of judicial consistency in enforcing
15. One study shows that while arbitration reduced the costs of litigation by about 20%, it
had no significant impact on the duration of the dispute. See Paul Marcotte, Avoiding Courts,
A.B.A. J., Dec. 1990, at 27.
16. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 78 (6th ed. 1990).
17. See Cutting the Cost of Commercial Conflict by Avoiding the Court: Alternative
Dispute Resolution Gains in Popularity, CORP. MONEY, Oct. 22, 1997, at 5 (recognizing that
arbitration is similar to litigation in that the outcome binds the parties and is based on an

examination of the relevant facts and laws).
18. See JAMES E. GRENIG, ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.36, at 25-26 (2d ed. 1997).
19. See id.
20. See Baig, supra note 12, at 131.
21. See John-Paul Motley, Note, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements in Employment
Contractsfrom Gardner-Denver to Austin. The Legal Uncertainty and Why Employers Should
Choose Not to Use Pre-EmploymentArbitrationAgreements, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 687, 688-89 (1998).
22. See id.
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compulsory arbitration clauses in both individual employment
agreements and collective bargaining agreements when employees
bring discrimination suits under federal statutes. 23 This Note traces
precedent from the Supreme Court as well as lower courts, and
examines the relevant portions of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA7),2 a federal statute governing arbitration issues.25 After
analyzing the legislative history of the federal discrimination
statutes, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, and after public rejection of mandatory arbitration
26
of discrimination claims by government and private organizations,
the Note concludes that employers should eliminate mandatory
arbitration clauses from pre-employment agreements. 27 The Note
recognizes that employers are now taking a strategic human
resources management ("SHRM") perspective, which encourages
employers to treat employees as one of their strongest competitive
advantages.2 8 The Note further concludes that employers should not
rely on legal precedent regarding arbitration clauses but should
decide to use only post-employment, voluntary arbitration
agreements-a practice that would emphasize the benefits of
arbitration and more closely follow the policy behind federal
29
antidiscrimination statutes.
The remaining two Notes in this Special Project focus on the
tensions between the FAA and state laws governing arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA as establishing a
broad national policy encouraging arbitration. 30 State laws that are
inconsistent with this policy are in danger of being invalidated as a
result of FAA preemption. 3 ' One Note, Equitable Estoppel and the
Outer Boundariesof FederalArbitrationLaw: The Alabama Supreme
Court's Retrenchment of an Expansive Federal Policy Favoring
Arbitration, focuses on the different approaches taken by federal

23. See id. at 693-702.
24. The relevant portions of the FAA are found in ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994)).
25. See Motley, supranote 21, at 691-93.
26. See id. at 708.
27. See id. at 716-19.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See David F. Sawrie, Note, Equitable Estoppel and the Outer Boundaries of Federal
Arbitration Law: The Alabama Supreme Court's Retrenchment of an Expansive FederalPolicy
Favoring Arbitration, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 721, 725-76, (1998); James Zimmerman, Note,
Restrictions on Forum-Selection Clauses in FranchiseAgreements and the FederalArbitration
Act: Is State Law Preempted?,51 Vand. L. Rev. 759, 762 (1998).
31. See Zimmerman supra note 30, at 763.
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courts and the Alabama Supreme Court regarding whether nonsignatories to arbitration agreements may, nonetheless, be bound by
such agreements. 32 Federal courts, consistent with interpreting the
FAA as encouraging the use of arbitration, have applied a doctrine of
equitable estoppel to bind non-signatories to arbitration clauses in
contracts. 33 The Alabama Supreme Court, which in the past had
expressed unwavering hostility to arbitration agreements, 34 has
developed a derivative version of the equitable estoppel analysis that
potentially narrows the scope of the federal doctrine.3 5 This Note
studies extensively the analyses employed by both federal courts and
Alabama courts and concludes that the state estoppel analysis is an
appropriate retrenchment of an expansive federal policy favoring
36
arbitration.
Finally, Restrictions on Forum-Selection Clauses in Franchise
Agreements and the FederalArbitrationAct: Is State Law Preempted?
focuses on the validity of forum-selection clauses in the arbitration
provisions of contracts, particularly in franchise agreements.3 7 When
negotiating a contract, a party with superior bargaining power may
employ a forum-selection clause to designate a remote, unfamiliar
forum and erect a barrier to arbitration, thus shielding the superior
party from liability.38 Many state laws are designed to remedy this

problem by invalidating forum-selection clauses providing for out-ofstate litigation or arbitration. 39 These state laws are in danger of
being invalidated, however, because of FAA preemption. 40 This Note
analyzes the scope of FAA preemptive power and argues that state
laws invalidating out-of-state forum-selection clauses do not
specifically disfavor arbitration clauses and, thus, do not undermine
the FAA's policy of encouraging arbitration. 41 The Note concludes
that these state laws are outside the scope of the FAA and should be
allowed to invalidate arbitration agreements calling for out-of-state
forums. 42

As these three Notes demonstrate, the increased use of ADR,
particularly arbitration, gives rise to pressing legal issues that the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See Sawrie, supra note 30, at 723.
See id. at 733-37.
See id. at 741.
See id. at 752-56.
See id. at 756-58.
See Zimmerman, supranote 30, at 760-61.
See id. at 760.
See id. at 773.
See id. at 779.
See id. at 779-84

42.

See id. at 784.
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courts and Congress have yet to settle. The goal should be to eliminate, or at least alleviate, some of the problems associated with arbitration and to ensure that arbitration remains a cost-effective, efficient, and fair way to resolve a dispute.
Shannon Evans Pinkston
Special Project Editor

